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Part II
Legal Aspects of Cooperative Organizational Structure
A leading proponent of agricultural cooperation has characterized
the plight which engendered the need for agricultural marketing combinations as the inability of the individual farmer to exact from a
buyers' market his "just economic due." 1 The terminology employed
alone renders the advocate's objectives suspect. But claims for preferential treatment of the cooperative corporation or association cannot be
summarily rejected. They may be intelligently appraised only against the
backdrop of economic conditions which stimulated the cooperatife movement and which, to an unascertained extent, still prevail.
Due to seriously depressed conditions in the agricultural markets
in the early decades of this century, it was perceived that encouragement
of producer combination to augment the farmers' bargaining power was
essential not only to their own well-being but also to that of the economy
as a whole. To this end, solicitous judicial treatment and favorable legislative enactments have insulated agricultural organizations from the
impact of state and federal statutes condemning combination. 2 The agricultural marketing organizations which have evolved have assumed
various forms. Legal relationships figuring prominently in this evolution include the corporation, unincorporated association, trust, agency,
partnership, and bailment. The cooperative, chameleon like, may
staunchly invoke its status as an entity in one situation while emphasizing in another context, the agency aspect of its activity.
Judicial acceptance of such apparent inconsistencies finds adequate
explanation only in an inarticulate conviction that cooperation should
be facilitated even at the sacrifice of individual interests and doctrinal
symmetry. In each instance, the fundamental problem is one of balancing
the desirability of deferring to the aims of cooperation by characterizing a transaction in the light most favorable to te association against
the disadvantage this course entails, such as defeat of an adverse party's
reasonable expectation. Decision rests ultimately on social and economic
1. "By 1890, however, labor and agriculture generally realized that their bargaining
ability to extract their just economic due from the total annual goods and services
was feeble when compared with the bargaining power of capitalistic corporate groups
inherent in the pricing power of big corporations and their subsidiaries and affiliated
companies." Jensen, Integrating Economic and Legal Thought on Agricultural Cooperatives in CooPERATIv CoRroRATE AssocIATIoN L ,w-1950, 37 (Jensen Ed. 1950).
2. 'See Part IV infra, passim.
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policy considerations beyond the scope of this discussion. It is an ambitious objective merely to attempt to cast aside the judicial trappings
frequently obscuring troublesome facets of the organizational structure
of cooperatives and objectively present the controversies involved.
A major source of difficulty in fitting the farm cooperative, whether
a corporation or an unincorporated association, into the same legal
mold as its counterpart in businesses conducted solely for profit 3 is the
dual relationship of the patron-member to the enterprise. He is both a
proprietor and one of the vendors with whom the cooperative transacts
the bulk of its business. Hence the rights and obligations of the member and of the organization stem from two distinct sources. The vendorvendee 4 aspect of this relationship is usually governed by a comprehensive, standardized agreement, entered into by each grower, referred
to as the marketing contract. While the numerous problems emanating
from this relationship will be discussed in detail in a later section, recognition of the court's reluctance to release a producer from his contractual
obligation in the event of a material breach by the association is important
at this juncture. 5
Problems to which the immediate discussion is addressed, are primarily those created by the association agreement, which governs the
member's relation to the cooperative in his capacity as an investor and
proprietor. This includes matters commonly embraced in the articles
and by-laws of an ordinary corporation, such as provisions relating to
powers of the organization, election and duties of directors and officers,
rights of creditors, qualifications of membership, and allocation and
.distribution of income. The unique position of the patron-member may
compensate, in part, for seeming inequities in judicial construction of
the marketing agreement. Improvident management detrimental to the
interests of the grower may frequently be checked in his capacity as a
3. "Profit" is used in the traditional sense, i.e. return on invested capital. Viewed
from another perspective, the co-op is not a nonprofit enterprise. It lacks all of the
distinguishing characteristics of an eleemosynary corporation. Its activities are calculated to enhance the financial position of its participants in proportion to their patronage.
4. This term is used loosely to characterize the marketing transaction. See Part III
infra, passinm.
5. Since the success of cooperation depends upon accumulation of substantial market
control to enable farmers to present a unified front against the highly organized market
for the produce, the courts have long accorded equitable remedies to the cooperative to
enforce marketing contracts, while regarding with disfavor attempts of the individual
grower to withdraw his crop from the pool. E.g., in Nebraska Wheat Growers' Ass'n
v. Smith, 115 Neb. 177, 195, 212 N.W. 39, 44 (1927), in a suit for specific enforcement
of a marketing agreement, the court rejected a defense of mismanagement by the
association's officers. It was observed that the members had at their disposal ample
means to insure the directors' compliance with the trust reposed in them without resort
to repudiation of their marketing contracts. See Part III infra, passim.

NOTES
shareholder or proprietor of the enterprise,'not only through immediate
control over directors and officers but also by means of remedies available to correct abuse of discretion.
The interaction of these two aspects of the member-patron's relationship -to the cooperative is aptly illustrated in Brame v. Dark
Tobacco Growers Cooperative Ass'n." The ostensible purpose of the
cooperative was to market dark tobacco grown by its members. Several
growers discontinued production of dark tobacco and entered the more
lucrative business of raising burley. The Dark Association received this
substitute crop, disposing of it through an agreement with a burley
cooperative, and adopted the position that its contracts with its members
entitled it to handle all tobacco grown by them. Patrons of the Dark
Association had entered into separate marketing and association agreements. At the instance of a recalcitrant burley producer, the court determined that the growers had not obligated themselves to deliver to
the organization any tobacco except the dark variety. In arriving at
this conclusion, the court conceded that the liberal use of "tobacco" in
the marketing agreement would support the broad construction urged
by the association. However, the associationagreement and subsequent
articles of incorporation indicated clearly that the sole purpose of the
organization was to merchandise dark tobacco. 7
While sometimes realistically merged with the marketing contract,
the association agreement constitutes a distinct relationship independently
governing numerous aspects of the member's interest in and obligations
6. 212 Ky. 185, 278 S.W. 597 (1925).
7. A persuasive factor militating against the contrary result may be found in the
court's determination that the two products are not in competition since dark is mostly
exported and used for different products. "An orderly marketing of burley is not
essential to establish dark tobacco markets or minimize speculation or waste in production or marketing of dark tobacco." Brame v. Dark Tobacco Growers' Coop. Ass'n,
212 Ky. 185, 196, 278 S.W. 597, 602 (1925).
The technique here employed presumably achieved a result commensurate with the
actual intent of the parties to the two agreements. Careful differentiation of the two
relationships will facilitate clear analysis of the difficulties which arise between members
and cooperative and promote certainty in their dealings. Following meticulous characterization of the problem, however, resort to a separate set of relations may well be
justified in seeking indicia of the intended connotation of the particular agreement in
question. The courts frequently have not observed this degree of care in their approach
to the problems of cooperatives.
Another decision in which the court apparently relied heavily upon the membership
arrangement to solve a conflict arising under the marketing contract is Kansas Wheat
Growers' Ass'n v. Rowan, 125 Kan. 710, 266 Pac. 101 (1928).' In a suit to recover
damages for breach of the marketing contract and to enjoin the grower from disposing
of wheat then in his possession, the defense was interposed that the agreement had
been procured by fraudulent representations of the co-op's agent. Pointing out that
defendant had signed the articles and by-laws and hence was affected with knowledge
that the representations were ultra vires, the court rejected his contention that he had
justifiably relied upon such representations.
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to the cooperative which are entirely beyond the scope of the former
instrument. For example,. in Burley Tobacco Growers' Cooperative
Ass'n v. Tipton,8 all marketing contracts with growers had expired. It
was urged that the association having become inactive, continued retention of the so-called "1% fund", deducted from gross sales for
operating costs, credits aid commercial purposes, served no useful purpose. Hence, suit was initiated to compel the association to reduce the
fund to cash and distribute it among the members. The court conceded
that ultimately the fund was destined for such distribution. But it sustained the directors' exercise of discretion in retaining this asset, invested in warehousing corporations upon which possible future 'operation was dependent, on the ground that maintaining the association in
readiness to resume business might well be in the best interest of the
members. Under the association agreement, authority to make such
decisions is conferred upon the board -of directors; that the organization no longer possessed any marketing contracts did not vitiate this
underlying agreement.
The validity of the marketing contract, on the other hand, may well
depend upon the existence of a supporting membership agreement between the patron and the association. In Tulsa Milk Producers' Cooperative Ass'n v. Hart,9 the cooperative sued an alleged member for
nondelivery of his crop. Since he only had signed a marketing agreement, prior to incorporation, and had never thereafter perfected his
membership in the organization, the court sustained his defense based on
the theory that under the by-laws the contract could not become operative
until the contracting grower had become a member of the association."
8. 227 Ky. 297, 305, 11 S.W.2d "119, 122 (1928).
9. 145 Okla. 263, 292 Pac. 558 (1930).
10. See also Edrmore Marketing Ass'n v. Skinner, 248 Mich. 695, 227 N.W, 681
(1929). Plaintiff, a cooperative, sued defendant for liquidated damages for nondelivery
of a portion of his 1928 crop (deliveries had been made for prior years). Defendant
successfully defended on the ground that a condition precedent to enforcement of
the marketing contract had not been fulfilled, since 50% of the potato acreage in the
specified territory had not been enlisted. Defendant's prior deliveries were not deemed
to constitute a waiver since he had no means of knowledge regarding compliance with
the condition. It was further argued on behalf of the co-op that since liquidated
damages provision had been incorporated in the by-laws, the grower was liable on that
basis. However, it was found that defendant had exercised no rights of membership
aside from his participation in the marketing agreement. Since the latter was invalid, so
was the alleged membership. This case provides further illustration of the complex
inter-relationship between the two agreements.
An interesting decision concerning a suit upon a pre-incorporation marketing contract
is Hart Potato Growers' Ass'n v. Greiner, 236 Mich. 638, 211 N.W. 45 (1926). A
50% acreage provision similar to that in the Edmore case was involved. After the
co-op had been incorporated and defendant had received proper notice that the requisite
acreage had been acquired, he defaulted on his commitment to deliver his crop. Sustaining
the cooperative's cause of action, the court spurned defendant's insistence that plaintiff

NOTES
This complex status of the grower-member, a significant point of
differentiation between the cooperative and other corporations," explains an important peculiarity of cooperative law. The modern position with regard to ultra vires transactions and apparent authorityto the effect that a corporation is estopped to disclaim the detriment
of a contract entered into in the regular course of business on the ground
that the undertaking was beyond its power or its agent's authority-has
limited impact upon the dealings of a cooperative. The farm cooperative
transacts most of its business with members. And, since members are
presumed to have cognizance of the exact scope of the cooperative's
powers, they may not urge the doctrine of estoppel against the organization if it subsequently repudiates the arrangement as an unwarranted
assumption of authority or an ultra vires act. 12
Potentially one of the most effective weapons available to the member to insure honest, prudent direction of his organization and prevent
unwarranted inroads upon his proprietary interest is the suit to redress
breach of a fiduciary duty. It seems plausible that the source of such a
fiduciary relationship may be either the association agreement or the
marketing contract. Indeed, this is an area in which the courts have
failed to articulate precisely the origin of the obligations which they
impose. It may be suspected that such a duty is frequently derived from
the overall character of the two interconnected relationships. A possible*
explanation may well be a judicial desire to find a substitute remedy to
fill the gap left by .the extraordinary constructions which have been
engrafted upon marketing contracts to enable cooperatives to preserve
their market control. In view of the inadequacy of established contract
remedies to protect the interests of patrons, the fiduciary theory of
had no legal existence when the contract was made and that it was initially wanting
in mutuality. Defendant had made an offer in writing to enter a contract with the
proposed corporation and had held the offer open until it had been accepted by the
duly constituted entity. In another suit on a pre-incorporation marketing contract the
same result was achieved on the basis of estoppel. Kansas Wheat Growers' Ass'n v.
Windhorst, 131 Kan. 423, 292 Pac. 777 (1930).
11. To this effect see Cooperative Milk Service v. Hepner, 81 A.2d 219, 224 (Md.
1951). "Cooperative associations differ from ordinary business corporations principally,
in that they dg most of their business with their own members. . . . It may be
doubtful whether an ordinary business corporation, if and when it deals with its
stockholders as such, is under any less duty of fairness and equality than a cooperative.
But when majority
Stockholders are not trustees or qursi trustees for each other ....
stockholders use their voting power for their own benefit, for some ulterior purpose
adverse to the interests of the corporation and its stockholders as such, they thereby
become fiduciaries and violate their fiduciary obligations."
12. California Canning Peach Growers' Ass'n v. Williams, 69 P.2d 893 (1937),
subsequent opinion, 11 Cal.2d 221, 78 P.2d 1154 (1938); California Canning Peach
Growers Ass'n v. Harkey, 69 P.2d 915 (1937), subsequent ophdon, 11 Cal.2d 188, 78
P.2d 1137 (1938); Kansas Wheat Growers' Ass'n v. Rowan, 125 Kan. 710, 266 Pac.

101 (1928).
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redress and other remedial devices assume increased significance in this
area. Hence, more widespread acceptance of this theory is to be encouraged, as is the development of high standards of director responsibility.
Due to the principle of equality, which is deeply engrained in the
philosophy underlying the cooperative movement, 13 and the fact that
directors are typically farmers who themselves conduct considerable
business with the association and are therefore thoroughly familiar with
its method of operation, a persuasive argument can be advanced for the
imposition of a higher fiduciary standard upon such directors than that
enjoined upon ordinary corporate officials. However, if encouragement
of a vigorous and expanding cooperative program is the primary objective, the desire to subject cooperative officials to an exacting standard
of conduct for the protection of individual participants must be tempered
by the realization that such stringent requirements may unduly fetter
managerial discretion or deter capable men from assuming the burdensome responsibilities.

14

Under the traditional view applied to ordinary corporations, a director is not responsible for the misdeeds of officers or agents, other
than his co-directors, unless he was a direct participant, failed to exercise
ordinary care in the selection or supervision of the offending officer, or
knew or had reason to know of the dereliction. This rule has been
applied to cooperative directors, 15 although to absolve such officials from
liability to this extent is perhaps unrealistic, in view of the directors'
more intimate connection with the everyday affairs of the association.
When the action of directors themselves proves highly detrimental to
certain stockholders with a consequent advantage inuring to others, a
fiduciary duty has been imposed. Where directors of a corporation, pursuant to a plan for reorganization, arranged the purchase of shares from
stockholders ineligible for membership in the contemplated cooperative,
See notes 43-57 infra, and accompanying text.
"Experience demonstrated that if co-operative societies were to be really encouraged, a law was necessary which would offer the advantages of corporate form to
exchanges, unions, and other associations, and at the same time allow great freedom of
self-direction and self-control in the co-operative effort for mutual benefit." Loch v.
Paola Farmers' Union Coop. Creamery & Store Ass'n, 130 Kan. 136, 138, 285 Pac. 523,
524 (1930).
15. In Lowell Hoit & Co. v. Detig, 320 Ill. 179, 50 N.E.2d 602 (1943), the
court enunciated this general rule, absolving directors from liability for conversion by
the manager of the cooperative, of which the directors had no knowledge and which
they could not have discovered in the exercise of ordinary and reasonable supervision.
For a decision imposing a patently lax standard of conduct upon erstwhile directors
who jerfect preferences in the insolvent co-op's assets immediately upon resignation, see
Farmers Co-operative Ass'n of Bertha, Minn. v. Kotz, 222 Minn. 153, 23 N.W.2d 576
13.

'14.

(1946).

-

NOTES

the court perceived a fiduciary relation between the managing officers and
the shareholders, with a concomitant duty to make full disclosure to such
shareholders of all facts relevant to evaluation of the shares subject to
purchase.'- In Bogardus v. Santa Ana Walnut Growers-Ass'n,7 members of a marketing cooperative sought to prevent the association from
distributing to withdrawn members money returned to the local from
the central cooperative. There funds had originated in the central's
operating reserve fund to which the ex-members had contributed. The
court construed a by-law forfeiture provision as inapplicable to a withdrawn member's interest in the revolving fund to which he has contributed. Despite language of purchase and sale and references to passage
of title in the marketing contract, the actual relation between the grower
and the cooperative was one of a trust or fiduciary character.' 8 The
funds in controversy constitited a trust res, distributable on a pro rata
basis to each contributor.' 9 Implicit in CooperativeMilk Service v. Hep16.

Snyder v. Colwell Cooperative Grain Exchange, 231 Iowa i210, 3 N.W.2d 507

(1942).
17. 41 Cal. App.2d 939, 108 P.2d 52 (1941).
18. Another case which has recognized the "trust fund doctrine", at least to a
limited extent, is Burley Tobacco Growers' Cooperative Ass'n v. Brown, 229 Ky. 696,
707, 17 S.W.2d 1002, 1006 (1929). The court there observed: "It may be that it
would be improper to call the fund a general corporate asset, [1% reserve fund] and
it may be that it would be improper to call it a trust fund, but it is a corporate asset
which may be used for the specific purposes mentioned in the contract, and it partakes
of the nature of a trust fund in that any balance unexpended for purposes mentioned
in the contract will be distributed at some time, either when the association so directs,
or when its existence is at an end."
In Rhodes v. Little Falls Dairy Co., 230 App. Div. 571," 245 N.Y. Supp. 432 (Sup.
Ct. 1930), a patron sued a milk handling cooperative for an accounting and for distribution of his proportionate share of withheld earnings. The court observed that plaintiff's
complaint alleged facts constituting a fiduciary relationship 'similar to a joint venture,
"in which case an action in equity is maintainable for an accounting, and is not unlike
that of an agent who has been intrusted with his principal's money or property to be
expended or dealt with for a specific purpose, in which case the agent is at all times
amenable to the process of the court to show that his trust duties have been performed
and the manner of his performance." Nor was it necessary that there be a technical
trust. Where a relationship of agency and confidence exists and the agent has received
property of the principal for which he refuses to account, a court of equity may take
jurisdiction. Id. at 573, 245 N.Y. Supp. at 434.
19. It should be noted that the fiduciary duty extended to withdrawn, as well as
existing members, and required distribution on a pro rata basis to each contributor
to the fund in question. Bogardus v. Santa Ana Walnut Growers' Ass'n, 41 Cal. App.
2d 939, 956, 108 P.2d 52, 58 (1940).
A case in which the court arguably refused to limit the scope of a director's fiduciary
duty to consequences of his own acts or omissions is Kansas Wheat Growers' Ass'n v.
Windhorst, 131 Kan. 423, 292 Pac. 777 (1930). Defendant member sought to resist
suit for breach of his marketing contract on the ground that the acreage control requisite
to put the contracts into effect had never been achieved. He had been an inactive member
of the committee responsible for certifying that the prescribed acreage had been secured.
The court rejected his contention that only his own acts and omissions should be imputable to him. However, the case can be viewed as one in which he had no right
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ner20 is a similar recognition that officers and directors of a cooperative
occupy a position of trust with regard to their mehnbers and may not
favor one faction at the expense of another. 2 1 The court also suggested
an interesting analogy which might be used as a basis for advocating
recognition of a fiduciary duty in all instances in which officials deal
with members, i.e., the most highly developed observance of the fiduciary
concept in the corporate field is in the area of direct dealings between
officers and shareholders. As previously pointed out, this phenomenon,
unique in ordinary corporate dealings, is a typical attribute of co22
operative transactions.
One pitfall which the injuied patron must carefully avoid is the
adeptness with which courts have discerned a waiver of rights against
directors and officers based on some form of acquiescence in the challenged activity. Failure to object promptly upon discovery of frauidulent
inducement to enter a marketing contract has been deemed a waiver of
the right to rescind. 23 Amendment of a charter to permit accumulation
of reserves, although only prospective in effect, coupled with negotiatiofi of a new marketing contract subsequent to the change, has been
regarded as an affirmation of the association's previous improper accumulation of reserves. 24 The absence of objection to a deviation from
the prescribed allocation of profits and losses until such time as the nonobservance of this provision proves detrimental to the challenger has
been characterized as consent to modification of the contract.2 5 Failure
to select competent officers may deprive members of the right to question performance of the trust reposed in such officials. 26 While these
decisions may appear harsh due to the absence of certain elements of
estoppel, in each case acceptance of the plaintiff's theory of recovery
might have proved injurious to the success of the organization. Under
such circumstances the court may be tempted to subordinate the rights
to rely upon the good faith and diligence of other members of the committee and hence

was held for a negligent omission.
20. 81 A.2d 219 (Md. 1951).
21. In the Hepner case, supra note 20 at page 224, the court suggested that when
majority shareholders use their voting power for their own benefit, to the detriment
of the interests 6f the co-op or its minority shareholders, they may become fiduciaries
and violate their fiduciary obligations.
22. However, see notes 55-56 and accompanying text, to the effect that some members
may be benefitted to a greater extent than others, if for reasons beyond the control
of the co-op.
23. Kansas Wheat Growers' Ass'n v. Oden, 124 Kan. 179, 257 Pac. 975 (1927).
24. Mountain View Walnut Growers' Ass'n v. California Walnut Growers' Ass'n,
19 Cal. App.2d 227, 65 P.2d 80 (1937).
25. Matanuska Valley Farmers' Coop. Ass'n v. Monaghan, 188 F.2d 906 (9th Cir.

1951).
26. Nebraska Wheat Growers' Ass'n v. Smith, 115 Neb. 117, 195, 212 N.W. 39, 44
(1927).

NOTES
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of the individual to the interest of the group and may indulge in hypercritical scrutiny of the plaintiff's conduct to uncover some technical
basis for denying recovery. Hence, the patron-member must exercise
considerable diligence if he is to protect his interests against the neglect
or depredations of those who conduct the cooperative enterprise.
Beyond the direct suit to redress breach of a fiduciary duty in the
name of the association or in the plaintiff's own behalf, there are several
other devices which may prove successful in vindicating the rights of
injured members in appropriate circumstances. Perhaps foremost among
these is an action for ail accounting. This is an appropriate remedy
where the court can be induced to characterize the cooperative as an
agent entrusted with the grower-principal's property for a specific purpose. Under these circumstances a court of equity will compel the agent
tb reveal the nature of the questioned transaction in order to demonstrate that his duties have been properly performed. 27 Even though
title may have passed and no technical trust exists, the transactions may
still be considered fiduciary in character. Regarded in this light, the
cooperative, which assumed the duty of disposing of its patrons' property for the best price obtainable and returning the proceeds less specified deductions, possesses knowledge access to which plaintiff is entitled;
and these facts may be ascertained in a proceeding for an accounting. 28
The same result has been achieved despite by-laws expressly denying the
remedy. 29
A more drastic remedy, appropriate only in cases of extreme mismanagement, would completely wrest control from the offending directors by means of appointment of a receiver.3 0 In McCauley v.
Arkansas Rice Growers' Co-op. Assn,31 this relief was sought in a
complaint alleging numerous abuses from negligence to outright fraud.
It was ascertained, however, that the facts failed to sustain these allega27.
Supp.
28.
quent
29.

See discussion of Rhodes v. Little Falls Dairy Co., 230 App, Div. 571, 245 N.Y.
432 (Sup. Ct. 1930), in note 18 supra.
Reinert v. California Almond Growers' Exchange, 63 P.2d 1114 (1937), subseopinion, 9 Cal.2d 181, 70 P.2d 190 (1937).
Reinert v. California Almond Growers' Exchange, 9 Cal.2d 181, 187, 90 P.2d

190, 193 (1937).
30. An even more extreme device, in view of the general tenor of judicial opinion
with regard to specific enforcement of marketing contracts, was sustained in New
Jersey Poultry Producers' Ass'n v. Tradelius, 96 N.J. Eq. 683, 126 Atl. 538 (Ct. Err.
& App. 1924). An association sued a recalcitrant member to compel delivery and the
latter invoked the unclean hands doctrine on the theory that the association had failed
to grade the produce according to the contract. While acknowledging that violation of
a collateral covenant would not discharge the member from his duty to deliver, the court
felt that this substantial deviation should preclude the corporation from seeking redress

in equity.
31. 171 Ark. 1155, 287 S.W. 419 (1926).
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tions and that the demonstrated breaches of discretion, including unauthorized purchases of rice in derogation of the association agreement,
could be rectified by a restatement of accounts. Two interesting sidelights in the opinion are worthy of note: a dictum suggested that an
attempt to withhold superfluous reserves for contingencies might be
thwarted by injunction ;32 and breach of the association agreement was
urged by plaintiffs as justification for releasing them from their marketing contracts." The latter contention was summarily rejected with the
observation that such a step would cripple the cooperative to the serious
detriment of its remaining members. In Doss v. Farmers Union Cooperative Gin Co.,8 4 the device suggested by the McCauley dictum was
unsuccessfully invoked. A shareholder's suit to enjoin a cooperative
from allocating net profits to patronage dividends without first paying
dividends on the common stock was defeated by applying a permissive
construction to the language of a typical by-law provision. 5 This decision constitutes a formidable obstacle to efforts to compel payment of
a share dividend where the articles and by-laws follow this pattern.3 6
32. Id. at 1173, 287 S.W. at 424.
33. Id. at 1168, 287 S.W. at 423.
34. 173 Okla. 70, 46 P.2d 950 (1935).
35. The provisions of the 1y-laws dealing with dividends and profits provided for
distribution in this order: (1) not less than 10% to be set aside in reserve fund until
fund equals 50% of the capital stock; (2) dividends not over 8% may be declared at
the discretion of directors, 5% may be set aside for educational purposes; (3) the
remainder of the net profits shall be apportioned to members ratably on the amounts
sold to co-ops by members. Id. at 70, 46 P.2d at 950.
. 36. Plaintiff further contended that under this decision, though having invested
money in the business, a stockholder has no legal right to demand or expect a share
in the division of profits. The court replied that a cooperative is "a special and peculiar
form of business enterprise which is not within the class of corporations designed
purely and solely for money profit." To strengthen this conclusion, the court quoted
from Justice Brandeis' decision in Frost v. Corporation Commission, 278 U.S. 517
(1929) : "The act further discourages entrance of mere capitalists into the co-operative
by provisions which permit 5 percent of profits to be set aside for educational purposes;
which require 10 percent of the profits to be set aside as a reserve fund, until such
fund shall equal at least 50 percent of the capital stock; which limit annual dividends
on stock to 8 percent, and which require that the rest of the year's profits be distributed
as patronage dividends to members, except so far as the directors may apportion them
to nonmembers." Id. at 71, 46 P.2d at 951.
In Callaway v. Farmers' Union Cooperative Ass'n of Fairbury, 119 Neb. 1, 226
N.W. 802 (1929), directors had declared a dividend and plaintiff sued to compel its
declaration. The court avoided issuing a mandatory injunction requiring payment
by relying on a by-law providing for submission of any proposed measure to the
shareholders for approval or rejection. Finding the declaration subject to revision
or veto by such a referendum or initiative, the court held that it "was not binding
upon the co-op until a reasonable time for referendum and review had expired. Since
the directors had rescinded within such time, no rights were created by the prior
declaration. While the attempt to control the conduct of directors through injunctive
relief was ineffective, the case also suggests referendum and initiative as conceivable
instrumentalities of control by the shareholders.

NOTES
An anticipatory technique which may effectively be used to forestall
contemplated managerial undertakings which threaten to undermine the
interests of members or patrons is the declaratory judgment. 3 7 Such a
proceeding may prove particularly effective in unsnarling the complexities surrounding disposition of cooperative assets upon dissolution. 38 A further measure which may be useful to the dissatisfied
member who is unable to document his complaints against the association's management is the right to inspect the organization's books.
This right has been sustained at common law, in the case of a nonstock
cooperative corporation, although statutory provisions relating to inspection were expressly limited to stock corporations. 9
While the remedy has not been frequently invoked, there is no
reason to believe a member may not enforce a right inuring to the entity,
either through a derivative or a representative action. In Olson v.Biola
Cooperative Raisin Growers Ass'n,40 members of a cooperative demanded
that directors enforce liquidated damages provisions of the marketing
contract, on the theory that delivery of wet raisins by certain members
violated this agreement. Their request having been rejected, the members
initiated an action against offending producers, attributing the directors'
nonaction to the fact that a majority of their number had been personally
involved in the alleged breach. The court tacitly acknowledged their
right to thus vindicate a right of the association under these circumstances.41 This remedy, if not rendered cumbersome by the appendage
of judicial or legislative prerequisites, such as approval by a majority of
the shareholders, can constitute an effective deterrent to official abuses'
as well as a convenient means to enforce rights of the association over
the opposition of unwilling directors.
The basic attributes of cooperation-democratic control, 42 limited
return on capital, and sharing of benefits, savings and risks in pro37. Bogardus v. Santa Ana Walnut Growers Ass'n, 41 Cal. App.2d 939, 108 P.2d 52
(1940).
38. Attinson v. Consumer Farmer Milk Co-op, 197 Misc. 336, 94 N.Y.S.2d 891
(Sup. Ct 1950). See note 60 infra, and accompanying text.

39. State ex rel. Boldt v. St. Cloud Milk Producers' Ass'n, 200 Minn. 1, 273
N.W. 603 (1937).
40. 184 P.2d 742 (Cal. App. 1947).
41. Ibid. It found, however, that the liquidated damages clause was inapplicable
to qualitative breaches since the damages consequent upon such default were subject

to precise ascertainment.
42. An almost inevitable characteristic of the farm co-op is the one vote per member
formula which emphasizes the mutual benefit of producers on a patronage basis, as
contrasted with the more familiar corporate scheme of control geared to capital contribution. See Part I, p. 360 supra. However, deviations from this principle are not entirely
wanting. See e.g., Alfalfa Growers of California v. Icardo, 82 Cal. App. 641, 645, 256
Pac. 287, 289 (1927), in which voting strength was based on units of interest in the
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portion to patronage--have given rise to numerous organizational problems peculiar to farm cooperatives. Each of these attributes is but one
aspect of the more fundamental principle of equality underlying the
entire development of agricultural cooperation. This principle merits
further discussion, first in the abstract and then in. the context of the
various concrete situations in which proprietary and creditor interests
in cooperative assets are asserted.
The real significance of the doctrine of equality as a unique characteristic of cooperation is vividly illustrated in Connecticut Milk Producers Ass'n v. Brock-Hall Dairy Co. 43

Although all members of

this association marketed milk of the same quality, the fluid milk commanded a higher price than that sold for processing. Under a program
worked out by a cooperative selling agent to dispose of "homeless" milk
in the surplus season, certain members, who sold exclusively to fluid
milk dealers, were in effect subsidizing others who sold, also through the
cooperative, to large dairies equipped to process the excess over their
fluid requirements. This was true because continued operation of the
program ultimately depended upon an equalizing membership assessment,
which certain of the members in the former category resisted. Sustaining the association's position, the court observed that it was: ". . .within
the powers of the co-op to deal with members as a group and to call
upon certain of them to surrender something of their own individual
advantage in order to improve marketing conditions for those less
fortunately situated."4 4 While this decision supports the right of the
association to juggle, to a certain extent, the interests of its patrons in
an attempt to equalize the advantage inuring to each from its operation,
another court4 5 has imposed the exacting requirement that the cooperative account to members for proceeds of its operation strictly
according to pools, since the association, an almond growers' marketing
exchange, conducted its business on a pool basis. While adopting widely
differing approaches to the equality principle, the two decisions are not
necessarily inconsistent. InI the former, the quality of the produce of
property of the association with one additional vote for each ton of alfalfa produced
by each grower; and Tapo Citrus Ass'n v. Casey, 45 Cal. App. 796, 797, 115 P.2d 203
(1941), in which the articles expressly provided that voting power be unequal.
43. 122 Com. 482, 191 Adt. 326 (1937).
44. Id. at page 495, 191 Atl. at 332. In Tobriner, Legal Aspect of the Provisions
of Cooperative Marketing Contracts, 12 A.B.A.J. 23 (1926), the author points out
that the method of conducting co-op marketing transactions has an important bearing
on this question. Use of the sale and re-sale contract permits the association greater
latitude in adjustment of losses among its members than does the agency contract. For
further analysis of the various marketing arrangements see Part III, infra, passin.
45. Reinert v. California Almond Growers' Exchange, 9 Cal.2d 181, 70 P.2d 190

(1937).
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each member was identical, whereas in the latter, the almonds were classified according to size and quality.
The fundamental objective of cooperation under. discussion prohibits a cooperative from deliberately favoring certain of its patrons by
discontinuing its dealings with others because surplus supply threatens
to deflate the market. This position has been upheld against the contention that the marketing contract of the dismissed members merely
constituted the association a selling agent and that it had discharged
its duty by exercising good faith in attempting to procure a buyer. 46 In
this case, the court reiterated the now familiar principle of cooperative
law that a marketing organization is bound to exercise the same diligence and good faith to sell the produce of one member which it exer-.
cises in behalf of any other. Under this theory, each grower has an
interest in the proceeds from the sale of every other grower's crop.
Hence, when a patron sells through another channel, the association is
entitled to receive any benefit accruing to the recalcitrant member.47 A
perspective *hich frequently recurs in the cases dealing with the
equality problem and which strengthens the theoretical foundation of this
doctrine is the idea that the marketing contract constitutes a covenant
"running to and with every other member of the association."' 48
46. 208 Wis. 40. 242 N.W. 486 (1932).
47. In California Peach Growers v. Harvey, 69 P.2d 915 (1937), subsequent ophion,
11 Cal.2d 188, 78 P.2d 1137 (1938), the court observed that "all members have an
interest in the proceeds from the sale of defendant's peaches and are entitled to share
in the sum defendant received by reason of a sale made outside of his dealings with the
association." For a direct holding to the same effect see California Canning Peach
Growers v. Downey, 76 Cal. App. 1, 243 Pac. 679 (1925).
A refinement of this position is to the effect that a general managing agent of
a co-op, or even a director, has no apparent authority to release an individual grower
from his contract. Patrons, by virtue of their contractual relation with the association,
are affected with knowledge that any ostentibly official act which violates the principle
of equality is unauthorized. California Canning Peach Growers v. Harris, 91 Cal.
App. 654, 267 Pac. 572 (1928).
48. California Peach Growers' Ass'n v. Williams, 69 P.2d 893 (1937), Subsequent
ophtion, 11 Cal.2d 221, 78 P.2d 1154 (1937); Noble v. California Prune & Apricot
Growers' Ass'n, 98 Cal. App. 230, 276 Pac. 636 (1929).
The peculiar development of the law with regard to marketing contracts sometimes characterized as a lack of mutuality of remedies is perhaps best explained by
this theory. If a breach on the co-op's part entitled a grower to a release, the rule
of equality would be undermined and remaining members would suffer from diminished market control. McCauley v. Arkansas Rice Growers' Co-operative Ass'n, 171

Ark. 1155, 287 S.W. 419 (1926).

But see Staple Cotton Cooperative Ass'n v. Borodofsky, 143 Miss. 558, 108 So. 802
(1926), to the effect that an improper release of certain members from a marketing
agreement, entitled remaining participants to release. This decision seems contra to the
vast weight of authority in cases involving growers' remedies for the co-op's breach
of the marketing agreement. However, when the improper releases have been so
numerous as to cripple the effectiveness of the association, replacement of directors,
recovery of money damages from them, and other remedies short of absolute discharge
may be inadequate reparation.
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An important implication of cooperative equality is the subordination of the traditional profit motive for investment to the objective of
furthering the mutual interests of growers on a patronage basis. Hence,
in Doss v. Farmers Union Cooperative Gin Co.,49 a shareholder objected to a construction of the association's by-laws which he contended deprived him of any legal right to demand a share in the
division of profits on the basis of his invested capital. Accepting the
accuracy of the predicted consequences of their ruling, the court pointed
out, ".

.

. that a co-op is a special and peculiar form of business enter-

prise which is not within the class of corporations designed purely and
solely for money profits." This position was substantiated by reference
to the epic Frost Case5" in which Justice Brandeis observed that cooperative by-laws are designed to discourage investment of capital
with the primary objective of earning a return. 51
Cooperation is calculated to benefit participants personally only in
so' far as their interests as patrons are advanced through the operation
of the enterprise.5 2 A member in affiliating himself with a cooperative
is primarily interested in securing access to more efficient marketing and
other facilities and only in a secondary sense in acquiring a property
interest which will yield monetary returns. By the same token, all contributors to a reserve fund made availalle for distr'ibution have been
deemed entitled to share in the proceeds despite the fact that the membership of some has terminated and their sole claim is founded upon
their prior contributions. A contrary result would prefer existing mem53
bers as such and would defeat the objective of patronage-equality.
Basically, classification of members and disparity of treatment accorded them violates the equality theory. A California court frustrated
efforts of a cooperative to market the crops of certain peach growers,
classified as "renters" on a more favorable basis than peaches grown by
49. 173 Okla. 70, 46 P.2d 950 (1935).
50. Frost v. Corporation Commission, 278 U.S. 517 (1929).
51. See note 36 supra.

52. Driscoll v. East West Dairymen's Ass'n, 52 Cal. App. 468, 126 P.2d 467 (1942).
53. Consistent with the theory here enunciated, the court in Avon Gin Co. v. Bond,
198 Mis. 197, 22 So.2d 362 (1945), refused to grant an ineligible withdrawing
shareholder more than par value for his stock. Since non-shareholders were entitled

to participate in the assets on dissolution, granting the plaintiff the full book value
of his shares upon his retirement would detract from the rights of such nonmember
patrons. See also Ozona Citrus Growers' Ass'n v. McLean, 122 Fla. 188, 189, 165 So.
625, 626 (1935), in which a withdrawing member was permitted to recover his pro
rata part of the existing surplus arising from "retains" attributable to the handling
of crops during his period of membership. This result was achieved in spite of a

charter provision for forfeiture of "all rights and privileges in the association" upon
cessation of membership.
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the majority of its members. 54 The principle of equality dictates that
every one delivering produce to a cooperative, even in pursuance of an
agreement purporting to accord preferential status, must have his rights
determined by the same criteria which fix the rights of others. Reasonable classifications necessitated by the nature of the organization or the
circumstances will be upheld if such devices are not inherently discriminatory.5 5 A recent decision sharply emphasizes the view that no
violation of equality is inherent in special treatment accorded only to a
select group of members where this is the result of factors entirely
beyond the control of the cooperative.5" However, so deeply is the
concept of equality rooted in the law of farm cooperatives that some
courts have by indirection repudiated classification devices apparently
57
not discriminatory as between members similarly situated.
Questions involving the rights of individual members in the assets
of a cooperative arise primarily in situations in which the member has
severed relations with the association. When such controversies have
been litigated, it will be observed that a predominant consideration has
been the desire to effect a disposition fair to the individual asserting the
right while at the same time adhering to the principle of equality
essential to the preservation of the cooperative effort. While few clear
indicia of the proper resolution of disputes concerning dissolution or
consolidation of farm cooperatives are to be found, the courts will
presumably adhere to the established rules governing ordinary corporations in solving such problems. Deviations can be expected in situations
where existing corporation rules cannot be reconciled with the philosophy
of cooperation. In such instances the doctrine of patronage-equality is
likely to emerge as the guiding consideration.
In the event that the cooperative movement undergoes a decline in
popularity in the future, the question of dissolution is likely to become a
54. California Peach Growers v. Harkey, 69 P.2d 915 (1937), subsequent, opinion
11 Cal.2d 188, 78 P.2d 1137 (1937).
55.

HULBERT, LEGAL PHASES

OF CooPERAIvE ASSOCIATIONS
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(F.C.A.

BULL.

No. 50, 1942).
56. Cooperative Milk Service v. Hepner, 81 A.2d 219 (Md. 1951).
57. In Matanuska Valley Farmers Cooperative Ass'n v. Monaghan, 188 F.2d 906
(9th Cir. 1951), a cooperative handled several different crops and agreed to pay each
producer his share of the profits realized on resale of his particular crop. Actually,

only a very crude allocation of profits and losses among the various crops was ever

made. When this discrepancy was finally challenged, the court held that plaintiffs, by
their long acqu:escence in the cooperative's operations, had consented to a modification
of the contract. Similarly, in Alfalfa Growers of California v. Icardo, 82 Cal. App.
641, 256 Pac. 287 (1927), the court rigorously condemned a scheme whereby control
was geared to tonnage, membership fees were based on acreage planted to alfalfa,

and assessments were founded upon tonnage. Refusal to enforce an assessment was
attributed to the inequities which would ensue since non-owners and non-growers wereentitled to membership in the association.
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storm center of controversy. The problem will be magnified in intensity
by one of the most startling phenomena of the agricultural cooperative
development-the tremendous reserves accumulated by numerous associations through the device of deducting "retains" in excess of the association's actual expenses. At common law, disposition of assets upon
dissolution was a relatively simple matter. Only members of a nonstock
cooperative or shareholders of a stock company at the time of the dissolution were entitled to participate in the distribution of assets remaining
after payment of creditors. 5 The method of disposition can be substantially modified by statute or by the articles or by-laws of the organization. For example, one model charter stipulates that upon dissolution,
assets remaining after payment of debts and retirement of outstanding
stock are to be distributed ratably to patrons "on an equitable basis." 59
Whether to define "patrons" to include former and existing growers or
only those doing business with the association at the time of its demise
is a latent source of controversy under this proposed article.
In a recent dissolution case, 60 the court seemingly despaired of
achieving any satisfactory disposition of assets among potential claimants and announced that, in the absence of any applicable provision in
the article or by-laws, the members had no rights whatsoever. The
task with which the court was confronted, of unscrambling the assets
and devising an equitable plan for their distribution, was indeed a formidable one. Cooperation had been inaugurated in order to organize
farmers and consumers into a cooperative enterprise the announced purposes of which included the marketing of milk and furtherance of
economic and cultural welfare of the members and the public. While
producer-members had claimed surplus earnings attributable to their
phase of the cooperative's activities, a vast number of patronage dividend
vouchers printed on milk containers remained unclaimed. Referring to
the fact that the association carried on an extensive public education program relating to production and distribution of milk products, the court
concluded that it was primarily a civic enterprise and, broadly speaking,
constituted a "charitable corporation." Hence, the court concluded that
the assets were distributable, in the event of dissolution, according to
58.

Clearwater Citrus Growers' Ass'n v. Andrews, 81 Fla. 299, 87 So. 903 (1921);
op. cit. supra note 55, at 76. In the Clearwater case, the court rejected
claims of withdrawn members of a cooperative, deciding, by analogy to the rule governing lodges and fraternal organizations, that a withdrawing member forfeits his interest
in the association and -cannot invoke the rule against enforceability of forfeitures in
equity.
59. HtULBERT, op. cit. supra note 55, at 403, 411.
60. Attinson v. Consumer Farmer Milk Corp., 197 Misc. 336, 96 N.Y.S.2d 891 (Sup.
HULBERT,

Ct. 1950).
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the doctrine of cy pres. The case suggests the aura of confusion surrounding the problem and the difficulty of the0 1task of delineating the
rights of competing claimants which lies ahead.
Although consolidation likewise poses many problems as yet unsolved, proponents of cooperation may claim a major victory in Pearson
v. Clam Falls Co-op Dairy Ass'n.6 2 Minority shareholders objecting to
a proposed consolidation were required to accept shares in the newly
created entity in exchange for their interests in the predecessors of the
merged cooperative. In reaching this result, the court recognized that
most consolidation statutes provide for optional appraisal and cash payments to dissenters, but held that the absence of such a provision in the
Wisconsin statute did not render it unconstitutional. Significantly, the
omission was attributed to legislative awareness of the difficulties encountered by small cooperatives in attracting new capital to finance proposed consolidations. The interests of remaining participants would be
seriously jeopardized by a contrary holding. The decision is consistent
with the oft-repeated view that the property interests acquired by a
3
cooperative member are of secondary importance.6
Most frequent assertions of an individual interest in cooperative
assets have been pressed by the withdrawing member. ClearwaterCitrus
Growers"Ass'n v. Andrews6 4 has long been regarded as representative
of the common law on the subject of voluntary withdrawal. It was there
decided that" forfeiture of all interest in the cooperative's assets was an
incident of such withdrawal.6 5 Carefully drawn articles and by-laws
today expressly provide for voluntary withdrawal.6 6 A by-law provision for payment, within twelve months, of the face value of shares
of a member who dies or moves away has been upheld.67 In Driscoll v.
61. In Burley Tobacco Growers' Ass'n v. Tipton, 227 Ky. 297, 11 S.W.2d 119
(1928), it was held that the fact that a cooperative association was temporarily inactive
presented no ground for dissolution or distribution of assets.
62. 243 Wis. 369, 10 N.W.2d 132 (1943).
63. See note 36 supra.
A further issue in the Pearson case was whether dissenting minority shareholders
must accept patronage dividends from the old corporation in the form of stock in the
new. An affirmative decision was founded on the view that since patrons have no
right to insist on being paid such a dividend, the form of payment is a matter within
directors' discretion. Pearson v. Clam .Falls Co-op Dairy Ass'n, 243 Wis. 369, 373,
10 N.W.2d 132, 134 (1943).
64. 81 Fla. 299, 87 So. 903 (1921).
65. Actually, this case did not directly involve an application of the common law
since it was decided under a statute and by-law authorizing forfeiture. Clearwater
Citrus Growers' Ass'n v. Andrews, 81 Fla. 299, 206, 87 So. 903, 905 (1921).
66. See contract of CALIFORNIA WALNUT GRowERs' AssocrATIoN (1940).
67. Loch v. Paola Farmers' Union Cooperative Creamery & Store Ass'n, 130 Kan.
136, 285 Pac. 523, rehearing denied, 130 Kan. 522, 287 Pac. 269 (1930).
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East West Dairymen's Ass'n, 8 an erstwhile member demanded her pro
rata share of the reserves deducted from proceeds of milk sold by the
association during her term of memberhip. Conceding the validity of her
claim to an interest in the fund, the cooperative was sustained in the
contention that, pursuant to the applicable statute and by-laws, this
claim could not be realized until such time as the association was liquidated. Such a result was deemed the only alternative consistent with
the continued welfare of the enterprise. Enactments or by-laws providing for compensation of retiring shareholders will probably be construed to authorize payment of par value only. Since the non-shareholder
commonly is entitled to participate in the assets upon distribution, payments to withdrawing shareholders in excess of par would undermine the
interests of those patrons who possess no shares in the organization.6 9
By-laws and statutes providing for forfeiture upon voluntary disassociation from a cooperative have no application to unpaid or undistributed proceeds received from the sale of crops contributed by the
member prior to his withdrawal. 70 Such amounts are ordinarily considered to be a debt owed to the patron and not "property or assets"
of the cooperative to which forfeiture provisions apply. Here again
careful distinction must be drawn between rights founded upon the association agreement and those stemming from the marketing contract. 71
The former are vitiated by a separation from the association, if statute
or by-laws so provide, but the latter are subsisting rights based upon a
72
separate and enforceable relationship.
The revolving fund, an increasingly significant method of capitalization of agricultural cooperatives, presents a convenient solution to the
withdrawal problem. Under the revolving fund system, reserves are accumulated through deduction of "retains" from the proceeds derived
from marketing of members' crops. These retains are refunded periodically on a chronological basis. The members of longest standing are
68. 52 Cal. App. 468, 126 P.2d 467 (1942).

"

69. Two further incidental aspects of voluntary withdrawal are worthy of note:
In California Bean Growers' Ass'n v. Rindge Land & Navigation Co., 199 Cal. 168,
248 Pac. 658 (1926), it was held that a by-law providing that failure to deliver
terminated membership could only be invoked at the instance of the co-op and did
not relieve the defaulting member from compliance with his agreement in succeeding
seasons; a Kentucky court, in Carpenter v. Dummit, 221 Ky. 67, 297 S.W. 695 (1927),
sustained the validity of a restriction on alienation of stock. The provision had a
legitimate purpose, to retain control of the cooperative in friendly hands, and since
the membership of the association was large it was not an undue restraint.
70. According to Bogardus v. Santa Ana Walnut Growers' Ass'n, 41 Cal. App.2d
939, 108 P.2d 52 (1940), a withdrawing member's interest in the revolving fund is
in this category.
71. Hood River Orchard Co. v. Stone, 97 Ore. 158, 168, 191 Pac. 662, 666 (1920).
72. HULBERT, op. cit. supra note 55, at 74, 75.
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repaid first with retains subtracted currently from proceeds belonging
to members presently using the cooperative's facilities. The by-laws may
appropriately provide that funds so withheld and credited to individual
accounts will be repaid to disaffiliated members in the same manner
they would have been refunded had such members continued to participate in the cooperative enterprise. Thus, the withdrawing member is
entitled only to receive the balance of the proceeds of his crop less expenses, when such proceeds become available, and to be repaid his cbntributions to reserves when the cooperative sees fit to make like payments
73
to nonwithdrawing members with similar tenure.
Withdrawal may also be involuntary, as in the case of expulsion or
ineligibility to continue as a member of the association. In Adaws v.
Sanford Growers' Credit Corp.74 the by-laws provided that marketing
privileges could be denied to a shareholder for sufficient cause and, in
such an event, his equity in the organization should be adjusted as in
the case of voluntary withdrawal. The by-laws pertaining to voluntary
separation authorized disposition of stock only with unanimous consent'
of the directors. Failing to procure an acceptable buyer, the departing
member could require the directors to provide for the purchase of his
stock. The court frustrated an attempt by directors to effect a forfeiture
through their refusal to retire the offending member's stock. A member
of an association who for varied reasons becomes ineligible to continue
to participate in the enterprise is entitled to enforce rights still in
existence under his marketing contract 75 and also to receive the par
7
value of his stock in the organization. 6
A cooperative, like any other business enterprise, must display some
basis of financial responsibility to induce the extension of credit upon
which successful conduct of any commercial venture is predicated. The
problem differs with the character of the organization, i.e., whether it is
an unincorporated or a stock or non-stock corporation. Moreover, the
variety of approaches to the task of securing protection to, creditors is
limited only by the ingenuity of state legislatures and the drafters of
73. Reinert v. California Almond Growers' Exchange, 63 P.2d 1114 (1937), subsequent opinioj, 9 Cal.2d 181, 70 P.2d 190 (1937).
74. 135 Fla. 513, 186 So. 239 (1938).
75. HuLBERT, op. cit. supra note 55, at 75 (1942).
76. Avon Gin Co. v. Bond, 198 Miss. 197, 22 So.2d 362 (194S). See also Snyder
v. Colwell Cooperative Grain Exchange, 231 Iowa 1210, 3 N.W.2d 507 (1942), in
which plaintiff, a shareholder in the old corporation, was ineligible for membership in
a reorganized cooperative. It was held that a fiduciary duty existed between prior
holders and the managing officers seeking to purchase such ineligible shareholders'
stock Thus the officers were obligated to make full disclosure to plaintiff of all facts
bearing upon the value of the redeemed stock.
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articles and by-laws for farm cooperatives. 7 In keeping with the trend
toward insulating the agricultural cooperative from the impact of many
burdensome regulatory measures applicable to corporations generally,
there may be a strong tendency to provide only a minimal margin of
security to those extending credit to the cooperative. But the long run
effect of such a policy may be to subvert the very goals sought to be
advanced, by discouraging extension of credit.
Members of an unincorporated agricultural association assume full
financial responsibility for the obligations incurred by it. Herice, members of an association organized to market a pickle crop were jointly
liable not only for excess advances, but also for debts contracted by the
managing trustees in connection with the marketing operation.7 8 In an
incorporated cooperative having capital stock, shareholders whose subscriptions are paid in full ordinarily are subjected to no further liability
for the debts of the corporation in the event of insolvency.7 9 However,
there is no legal impediment to an agreement among all shareholders
-binding them to deliver to the cooperative their individual promissory
notes whether for the purpose of strengthening its credit or of protecting
directors from personal liability when they have found it necessary to
pledge their own credit to obtain needed funds. Such agreements have
been upheld against the contention that they were mere unenforceable
unilateral promises wanting consideration. 80 Consideration for the
promise of each shareholder is found in the execution by the others
of similar agreements for their mutual benefit."'
The range of variety in approach to the problem of members' liability for debts of a nonstock cooperative corporation is broad; strained
judicial constructions of exculpatory statutory and by-law provisions in
order to protect creditors have not been infrequent.8 2 In Lockport Cooperative Dairy Ass'n, Inc. v. Buchner,8 3 plaintiff cooperative became
77. Ky. REV. STAT. § 272.190(3) (1946). "No member shall be liable for the
debts of the association to an amount exceeding the sum remaining unpaid on his
membership fee or his subscription to the capital stock, including any unpaid balance
on any promissory notes given in payment thereof."
78. Tomlin v. Petty, 244 Ky. 542, 51 S.W.2d 663 (1932).

79. IND. STAT. ANN. § 15-1613 (Burns' Repl. Vol. 1950); Ky. REv. STAT.
§ 272.190 (1946).
80. Farmers' Coop. Union of Lyons v. Reynolds, 127 Kan. 16, 262 Pac. 108 (1928).
81. Farmers' Equity Co-op. Ass'n of Dresden v. Tice, 122 Kan. 127, 251 Pac.
421 (1926).
82. For example, the court in Lewis v. Monmouth County Farmers' Co-op. Ass'n,
105 N.J. Eq. 257, 147 Atl. 550 (Ch. 1929), found that a by-law provision expressly
negating personal liability for debts of the co-op in excess of a certain amount was an
ineffectual attempt to limit such responsibility.
83. 129 Misc. 73, 221 N.Y. Supp. 433 (Sup. Ct. 1925).
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unable to meet its maturing obligations and the directors, pursuant to
statutory authorization, levied a per capita assessment to secure funds
with which to accommodate creditors pressing for payment. Defendant
resisted collection on the ground that the articles of incorporation limited
individual liability to one dollar. Relying on a provision of the Membership Corporations Act under which plaintiff was incorporated, which
imposed liability on members for the debts of the association, the court
rejected this defense and condemned the charter provision as one in
derogation of the legislative purpose.8 4 In another jurisdiction the
statutory device developed for the protection of creditors of a nonstock corporation limits the liability of individual members to the
amounts due them under their marketing contracts. When the association has satisfied all claims of its members growing out of the
marketing contract for a given year, the potential liability of such members to creditors is extinguished. Until such time as the proceeds are
turned over to the growers, creditors have an equitable lien upon the
funds in the hands of the cooperative. 85 Another scheme adopted in a
few states renders each member initially liable for his proportionate
share of the cooperative's debts and obligations. In addition, the shares
of defaulting members are distributed per capita among remaining
members, with the qualification that no member's ultimate liability shall
exceed twice his initial share of the total debt. 8 6
Not infrequently cooperative charters authorize and articles or bylaws adopt a debt limitation.8 t In this event, members of a non-stock
corporation are absolved from liability for obligations incurred in excess
of this restriction; Legislation may impose personal responsibility on
directors for such excesses, thus providing some modicum of protection
to unwary creditors while limiting the risks assumed by the association's
patrons.8 8
84. While the applicable statute authorized establishment of a debt limitation beyond
which the cooperative could not contract obligations, the provision in question purported to fix a limitation on individual liability, even for debts within an established
debt limitation, in contravention of an express provision fixing liability on members
individually.
85. Bank of Aurora v. Aurora Cooperative Fruit G. & M. Ass'n, 91 S.W.2d 177
(Mo. App. 1936).
86. Mandell v. Cole, 244 N.Y. 221, 155 N.E. 106 (1926); Lewis v. Monmouth.
County Farmers' Coop. Ass'n, 105 N.J. Eq.-257, 147 Atl. 550 (Ch. 1929).
87. Federal Chemical Co. v. Paddock, 264 Ky. 338, 340, 94 S.W.2d 645, 647 (1936);
Lockport Coop. Dairy Ass'n, Inc. v. Buchner, 129 Misc. 73, 74, 221 N.Y. Supp. -433,
434 (Sup. Ct. 1925).
88. Federal Chemical Co. v. Paddock, 264 Ky. 338, 94 S.W.2d 645 (1936). This
decision also emphasizes the significance of protection of creditors by revealing that
the co-op involved had no capital and 'conducted its business entirely on borrowed
money.
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A perennial difficulty not peculiar to cooperative concerns preferential treatment of certain favored creditors to the serious detriment of
others, by a cooperative approaching insolvency. The dual status enjoyed by the patron-member makes this problem a perplexing one in
the cooperative context. While "insiders" are commonly the recipients
of the preference, such members also usually constitute the largest single
group of creditors, since a large proportion of the association's business
is conducted with its own proprietors.
One reason advanced for invalidating an attempted preference of
shareholder-creditors is that they occupy a favorable vantage point from
which to perceive the first symptoms of insolvency.8 9 Under this theory
a Kansas court vitiated a preference granted to ten shareholders in the
form of an assignment of promissory notes which were the obligations
of eight of the favored group. The court buttressed its position that
shareholder-creditors cannot be favored to the exclusion of outsiders
who also have extended credit to the association with the arguments that:
a) the notes had originally been contributed to make up an impairment
of capital and hence constituted a trust fund to which all creditors were
entitled to look for the satisfaction of their claims; b) the shareholders
in question not only had the advantages of the usual incidents of stock
ownership, such as the right of inspection, but also were active in the
management of the affairs of the cooperative.9 0
Directors of an insolvent cooperative corporation clearly cannot
satisfy their claims against the corporation in preference to the demands
of general creditors.9 1 This result can be substantiated on the trust
fund theory 2 or on the ground that the director occupies a fiduciary
relationship to others interested in the assets of the organization and is
forbidden to plunder its resources to satisfy personal claims when he
foresees financial embarrassment.9 3 However,, a recent Minnesota decision has adopted a singularly narrow construction of the rule, upholding
89. Leyden v. Calhoun Cooperative Creamery Co., 223 Ala. 289, 135 So. 317
(1931).
90. Clark v. Pargeter, 142 Kan. 781, 52 P.2d 617 (1935).

91. In Darling & Co. v. Petri, 138 Kan. 666, 27 P.2d 255 (1933), plaintiff supplied
fertilizer to a cooperative on a consignment basis. Defendant, a director of the
cooperative, had loaned it money and taken a note in return. He surrendered his note
and claim in exchange for fertilizer immediately prior to the co-op's insolvency.
Recovery against defendant was sustained on the theory that he was in effect a trustee,
with notice of the terms of the contract and that as against creditors of the consignee.
the consignor's rights are protected.
92. Clark v. Pargeter, 142 Kan. 781, 786, 52 P.2d 617, 620 (1935).
93. Farmers' Co-op Ass'n of Bertha, Minn., v. Kotz, 222 Minn. 153, 158, 23 N.W.2d

576, 579 (1946).

NOTES
a preference conferred upon a director and officer just one month after
he had resigned. 9 4 If his knowledge of impending financial difficulties
is the basis for rendering a director ineligible to receive a preference, as
the Minnesota case indicates, it is difficult to understand in what manner
this factor becomes insignificant upon resignation of the director on the
very eve of insolvency.9 5
Numerous regulatory measures have potential application to agricultural cooperatives because of the nature of the activities they engage
in and the corporate form under which they most frequently operate.
Review of the courts' delineation of cooperatives' immunities from and
obligations under these statutes reveals a crazy-quilt pattern indicative
of an incessant conflict among major governmental policies. On the
one hand, the courts are besieged with reminders of the depressed status
of farming in this country before the advent of cooperation, while on
the other the argument is urged that uniform achievement of a particular

social objective outweighs the slight inconvenience incident upon its application to the farm cooperative. Judicial solicitude for agricultural
cooperatives has resulted in their exclusion from the coverage of legislation regulating warehousemen, 96 imposing a97license tax on the privilege
of conducting various commercial activities, prescribing standards and
conditions precedent to the transportation of goods in interstate com94. This court recognized a split of authority on the question whether an insolvent
corporation can confer a preference and took the position that it can when it has
control of all its assets and such action will not prevent its continued, operation.
Farmers' Co-op. Ass'n of Bertha, Minn. v. Kotz, 222 Minn. 153, 23 N.W.2d 576 (1946).
95. A related problem concerns liability of a cooperative for negligent injuries
arising out of its operations. It seems clear that the cooperative entity should assume
the risks incident to its undertakings. This was the conclusion reached in Lichty v.
Carbon County Agriculture Ass'n, 31 F. Supp. 809 (M.D. Pa. 1940). However, in
Arkansas Valley Co-operative Rural Electric Co. v. Elkins, 200 Ark. 883, 141 S.W.2d
538 (1940), a cooperative electric power company successfully resisted liability on the
two-fold theory that defendant was a public quasi corporation having no obligations
not specifically provided by statute and that it was entitled to the immunity with which
some states still clothe charitable corporations.
The liability of a central cooperative for torts of its inadequately capitalized local
presents an interesting contrast with the rule ordinarily invoked in the parent-subsidiary context. Since, under the theory of cooperation, control moves upward from
the base of the pyramid, members of the local organization presumably direct the
activities of the central. Thus, the pattern of control which enables a court to disregard
the corporate entity of a subsidiary corporation and impose tort liability on the parent
cannot be found in the cooperative superstructure. An opinion emphasizing lack of
control as a reason for its refusal to impose liability on a central for a tort of the
local is Farmers' Educational and Cooperative Union of America v. Eakins, 188
Okla. 324, 108 P.2d 182 (1940).
96. Lexington Mill & Elevator Co. v. Browne, 116 Neb. 753, 219 N.W. 12 (1928).
97. Forrester v. Georgia Milk Producers' Confederation, 66 Ga. 696, 19 S.E.2d
183 (1942); Yakima Fruit Growers' Ass'n v. Henneford, 12 Wash, 437, 47 P.2d
831 (1935).
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merce,98 conferring upon creditors the right to institute involuntary
bankruptcy proceedings,99 forbidding commission merchants from purchasing on their own account, 10 0 imposing emergency price ceilings, 10 1
and defining prohibited spectjlative future transactions, 10 2 to name only
a few. In addition, several courts have engrafted unusually broad constructions upon the authorized powers provisions of cooperative charters.
For example, in State v. Consumers Cooperative Ass'n,10 3 a charter provision entitling the association to furnish its members with machinery,
equipment and supplies was deemed to justify its entrance into the oil
refining business and ownership of oil wells and pipe lines, and, in addition, the operation of canning plants, lumber mills, printing plants, paint
factories, and insurance and auditing enterprises.' 0 4 On the other hand,
decisions inimical to the cooperative movement can be found which impose upon these, organizations the restrictions embodied in state license
"taxes,'0 5 legislation governing public markets, 0 6 the federal bankruptcy
08
act, 10 7 and several others.1
A context in which the problem of cooperative immunity from
burdensome statutory requirements is brought into sharp focus is presented by the cases defining exemptive provisions employing the termi98. I.C.C. v. Jamestown Farmers' Union Federated Co-op. Transp. Ass'n, 57
F. Supp. 749 (D. Minn. 1944), .rff'd, 151 F.2d 403 (8th Cir. 1945).
99. In re Wisconsin Co-op. Milk Pool, 35 F. Supp. 787 (E.D. Wis. 1940), rev'd,
119 F.2d 999 (7th Cir. 1941).
100. Clinton Co-op. Farmers' Elevator Ass'n v. Farmers' Union G.T.A., 223 Minn.
253, 26 N.W.2d 117 (1947).
101. Bowles v. Inland Dairy Ass'n, 53 F. Supp. 210 (E.D. Wash. 1943).
102. Clark v. Murphy, 142 Kan. 426, 49 P.2d 973 (1935).
103. 163 Kan. 324, 183 P.2d 423 (1947).
104. In this connection, see Note, 36 CALIF. L. REv. 122-124 (1948).
See also American Cotton Co-operative Ass'n v. U.S. Warehouse Co., 193 Miss.
43, 7 So.2d 537 (1942), in which agents of a warehouse and a cooperative entered into
a scheme to defraud their- principals by negotiating warehouse receipts which should
have been cancelled when the goods they represented were withdrawn. Since a statute
regulating warehouse receipts imposed a nondelegable duty upon the warehouse company
to cancel such receipts, the cooperative was able to evade the detriment of its agent's
fraudulent activity by invoking the rule that the conduct of an agent acting adversely
to his principal's interests is not imputable to the principal.
105. Rockingham Co-operative Farm Bureau, Inc. v. City of Harrisonburg, 171
Va. 339, 198 S.E. 908 (1938); Irvine Co. v. McColgan, 26 Cal.2d 160, 157 P.2d 847
(1945).
106. West Central Producers' Co-op. Ass'n v. Com'r of Agriculture, 124 W.Va.
81, 20 S.E.2d 797 (1942).
107. For a comprehensive discussion, see Comment, 10 Wis. L. REv. 516 (1935).
108. E.g., in State v. Sho Me Power Co-operative, 354 Mo. 892, 191 S.W.2d 971
(1946), the court construed the word "including" in a statute prescribing powers of
cooperatives as restrictive rather than all-inclusive. An electric utility business conducted by the cooperative was not a mercantile business within the purview of the
statute.
HULBERT, Op. cit. supra note 55, § 302 et seq. contains an exhaustive discussion of
the impact of numerous regulatory statutes upon farm cooperation.

NOTES
nology "agricultural labor." The lines of controversy have been sharply
drawn by the appearance of diametrically opposed decisions in California
and Arizona. In the former state,1° 9 cooperatives have been accorded
the benefit of the "agricultural labor" exemption to the Unemployment
Insurance Act on the theory that the association is merely, an instrumentality of each individual participant. Since farm hands conducting
identical activities on the farm would not be embraced within the scope
of the act, the court reasoned that the performance of these functions
"incidental to ordinary farming operations" by a cooperative marketing
association at the central establishment was within the spirit of the
exemption. To comply with the literal terms of the statute the court
was forced to indulge the obvious fiction that the cooperative's activities
were conducted "on the farm."' 1 0 The Arizona court, conversely, assumed the position that employees of a marketing association engaged
in grading, sorting, cleaning, and wrapping fruits in the association's
packing plant were not "agricultural laborers.""' The Arizona decision
was founded upon recognition of the cooperative as a corporate entity
and refusal to "pierce the veil" to impute to the member-cooperative
relationship an agency or trust character.
Neither approach is to be advocated, 1 1 2 nor is either result necessarily incorrect. Rather, doctrinaire application of unmeaningful legal
formulae should be supplanted by a realistic evaluation of relevant policy
considerations. When there are no real indicia of legislative intent, the
court is at liberty to achieve a result most consistent with the welfare
of all interest groups affected by their decision. Much, of course, depends upon the severity of the burden which the act would impose upon
cooperation and the prevailing economic status of agriculture and of the
marketing associations themselves. Such factors may indicate the necessity of shielding cooperatives from any additional financial burden. On
109. California Employment Comm.ssion v. Butte County Rice Growers' Ass'n,

146 P.2d 908 (1944), subsequent ophnion, 25 Cal.2d 624, 154 P.2d 892 (1944). See also
Industrial Commission v. United Fruit Growers' Ass'n, 106 Colo. 223, 103 P.2d 15
(1940), in which a cooperative successfully claimed exemption from an Unemployment
Compensation Act of Colorado.
110. While the court in the California Employment Commission Case was entirely
correct in rejecting the separate entity theory as a basis for application of the statute,
the agency or instrumentality argument it adopted is equally questionable. California
Employment Commission v. Butte County Rice Growers' Ass'n, 146 P.2d 908 (1944),
subsequent opinion, 25 Cal.2d 624, 154 P.2d 892 (1944).
111. Employment Security Commission v. Arizona Citrus Growers, 61 Ariz. 96, 144
P.2d 682 (1944).
112. A similarly mechanical means of reaching a result was adopted 'in North
Whittier Heights Citrus Ass'n v. N.L.R.B., 109 F.2d 76 (9th Cir. 1940). The court
contrasted the means of accomplishing identical functions on the farm and in the
co-op warehouse. On the basis of apparent differences, they concluded that the latter
Was not entitled to benefit from an exemption intended to cover agricultural labor.
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the other hand, a policy strongly embedded in modern legal thinking,
and embodied in the legislative enactments under discussion, is that a
commercial entity should assume a portion of the risk of injury and
unemployment incident to its business. Another circumstance which
may be significant is the fact that administrative aspects of unemployment compensation render it particularly inadaptable to the small business such as the average farm unit. The agricultural labor exemption
may stem from the latter consideration rather than from any legislative
desire to exempt the farmer from the responsibilities growing out of the
conduct of his business.
In the past, legislative and judicial attitudes have been extremely
favorable to the farm cooperative, perhaps in response to the serious'
need to inject new vigor into our farm economy. With the advent of
improved agricultural conditions and enhanced farm prosperity, some
courts and legislatures have adopted a more critical approach to continuing cooperative demands for preferential treatment. Exact equilibrium among competing economic and social goals is, of course, unattainable. However, a continuing attitude of critical scrutiny of the claims
of all organized groups is the only satisfactory means of adjusting
governmental policy to the demands of changing economic conditions.

